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I. INTRODUCTION
The Texas Constitution requires the Texas Legislature to establish an "ef-
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ficient system of public free schools." 1 Although the legislature fulfilled its

role by promulgating a regional system of educating Texas children,2 the
present district system has proven to be highly inefficient 3 and ineffective.4
In 1989, the Texas Supreme Court addressed this inefficiency in Edgewood v.
Kirby,5 by holding that the present system of financing public education is
unconstitutional due to the reliance on local property taxes.6 The property
values vary greatly among districts, creating inequitable revenues per

1. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
2. DAVIS AND HAYES, EFFICIENCY AND INEFFICIENCY IN THE TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS

(1990) (copy on fie with St. Mary's Law Journal). There are 1055 local school districts in
Texas, with six additional special districts. Id. at 3 n.11.
3. Id. at 2. The Texas public schools employ more non-teachers than teachers, with expenditures for non-teaching activities reaching $5,000 per student in some Texas school districts. Id. at 8. Studies reveal that the most efficient economies of scale for the public school
system require an average of 2,000 students per district to function economically. DAVIs AND
HAYES, EFFICIENCY AND INEFFICIENCY IN THE TEXAs PUBLIC SCHOOLS 12 (1990) (copy on

fie with St. Mary's Law Journal). However, 73% of Texas school districts have less than
2,000 students. Id. From 1970 to 1988, spending per American public school student increased 59% in constant dollars. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION
1989, Table 1:14-1 (1990). The Texas Education Agency estimates that total spending for
Texas public schools was approximately $14.3 billion during the 1988-89 school year. DAvis
AND HAYES, EFFICIENCY AND INEFFICIENCY IN THE TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2 n.6 (1990)
(copy on file with St. Mary's Law Journal). Inefficiencies in public education are more acute in
large urban settings. See MASSANET, BASIC ISSUES IN AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 246-71
(1970) (panel discussion of reasons for inefficient urban schools). But see THAYER, AN END
To HIERARCHY! AN END To COMPETITION 81-115 (1973) (competition in in democracy leads
to waste).
4. Education Daily, Oct. 1, 1987, at 5. In 1989, Texas ranked 46th among the states in
Scholastic Aptitude Test scores. When compared to all the states in the U.S. in 1987, Texas
ranked 41st in SAT scores. See College Board, Sept. 12, 1989, chart 1 (average SAT scores by
state, 1979, 1984-1989). In addition, Texas ranks 47th in literacy of adults over the age of
twenty. Fortnightly, Texas A&M University, Dec. 11, 1989, at 2. Texas is not alone in the
decrease in the effectiveness of public education. The SAT scores of American college-bound
high school seniors fell ninety points between 1963 and 1981. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, Trends in Educational Achievement (1986). The National Assessment of Educational
Progress exam revealed that less than ten percent of all American thirteen year-olds are "adept" at reading, and less than one percent can be categorized as "advanced." Id. at 43, 46. On
a global standard, American eighth grade students ranked eleventh out of twelve on an international math examination given to children in twelve advanced industrial democracies. OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., YOUTH
INDICATORS 1988: TRENDS IN THE WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN YOUTH, 64-65 (1988).
5. 777 S.W.2d 391 (rex. 1989). See HAYES, EQUALITY AND INEQUALITY AMONG
TEXAS SCHOOLS, NCPA POLICY REPORT No. 147, NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS (1990) (copy on file with St. Mary's Law Journal).
6. Edgewood v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (rex. 1989). In 1985, the most wealthy
school district in Texas had seven-hundred times more property wealth per student than the
poorest. Id. at 392.
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student.7
Following the Edgewood decision, the inefficiency and glaring ineffectiveness of many states' public school systems has become more apparent due to
related suits in many states,8 independent and government sponsored research, 9 and national media attention."0 In November of 1990, twenty-seven
7. Id. An example of how this inequity effects the education of Texas' youth is found in
the Edgewood decision:
The differences in the quality of educational programs offered are dramatic. For example,
San Elizario I.S.D. offers no foreign language, no pre-kindergarten program, no chemistry, no physics, no calculus and no college preparatory or honors program. It also offers
virtually no extracurricular activities such as band, debate or football.
Id. at 393. In addition, San Elizario is one of the least efficient school districts in Texas. With
only 12% of the ninth grade students in the district passing the Texas Educational Assessment
of Minimum Skills (TEAMS) tests, San Elizario has the lowest pass rate in Texas. DAvIS AND
HAYES, EFFICIENCY AND INEFFICIENCY IN THE TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1990) (copy on file
with St. Mary's Law Journal).
The annual reports of the Texas Education Association reveal the disparity in state and local
revenues which were the basis for the finding of inequity in the Texas education system in
Edgewood:
San Antonio
Total Tax per
Annual State and Local
$100 Property Value
Revenues Per Student
District
2985
3170
2985
3126
2773
3427
3084
3287
4467
3099
4066
2458
TEXAS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION ANNUAL REPORT (1990) (copy on file with St. Mary's Law
Journal). Additional federal funding of school districts is not considered in the court's determination of what is equal for all students. Id.
8. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1990, at B7, col. 1 (listing states currently challenging their
public school system's efficiency). Suits which mirror the arguments and holding ofEdgewood
have been heard in Kentucky and New Jersey. Id.
9. See eg., U.S. DEPT. EDUCATION, CHOOSING A SCHOOL FOR YOUR CHILD (1989) (former Secretary of Education Lauro Cavazos endorses free choice of education); Lee, U.S.
Schools Need a Lesson in Competition, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 29 (Center for the Study of
American Business-Wash. Univ. 1988) (advocating running schools like a business to cut administrative costs); 1 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION, 1989: ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, 79 (1989); CHUBB AND MOE, EDUCATIONAL
CHOICE (1990).
10. See eg., San Antonio Express News, Aug. 23, 1990, at 2A (Secretary of Education
Cavazos reported on inefficiency of public school system and endorsed a voucher system); San
Antonio Light, Aug. 19, 1990, at I (future legislation needed to reform ineffective public eduEdgewood
Southside
South San
Harlandale
Southwest
San Antonio
Northside
Northeast
Alamo Heights
State High
State Mean
State Low

0.998
1.305
0.88
1.018
0.891
1.173
0.996
0.936
0.874
1.75
0.998
0.168
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Chicago parents brought suit against the city of Chicago alleging the right to
use their share of state educational funds at schools of their choice. 1 In
addition, publications such as those sponsored by former United States Secretary of Education Lauro Cavazos,12 encourage states all over the nation to
utilize the first school system to be implemented in Texas after the adoption
of the Texas Constitution in 1896 1 -- educational free choice. 4
cation in Texas); Houston Chronicle, Aug. 12, 1990, at 3A (discussion of switching from government to free-market system of public education); San Antonio Express News, July 20, 1990,
at 3 (increasing public awareness that state can't fix ailing school system without reform);
Amarillo Daily News, June 26, 1990, at 4A (report on the Brookings Institute proposal for
educational reform to cut education costs and improve quality of education).
11. Gannett News Service, Sept. 10, 1990, at 4.
12. See OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF
EDUC., CHOOSING A SCHOOL FOR YOUR CHILD (1989) (an explanation to parents why free-

dom of choice should be extended to schools). President George Bush has followed in President Ronald Reagan's footsteps by endorsing educational choice and drawing attention to
other advocates of the concept. See Steves, Oregon May Be First State to Allow Tuition Tax
Credits, Gannett News Service, Sept. 18, 1990 at 1. The present Secretary of Education, Lamar Alexander, has also placed great emphasis on "school choice." Wall Street Journal, May
2, 1991 at A19.
13. The Texas Legislature implemented a successful voucher system from 1856 to 1908.
See EBY, EDUCATION IN TEXAS; SOURCE MATERIALS, 830-31 (1918) (Univ. of Texas Bulletin

No. 1824). The system was abandoned due to inadequate funding due to a recessionary period. See Watts & Rockwell, The OriginalIntent of the EducationArticle of the Texas Constitution, 21 ST. MARY'S LJ. 771, 809-811 (1990). Some authorities believe that the use of the
language "public-free schools" in the present Texas Constitution is misinterpreted by many to
mean state owned schools for all to attend. See EBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION IN
TEXAS, 106-07 (1925). Historian Frederick Eby believes that the Texas Constitution literally
referred to schools open to the public, free to operate independently much like our private
schools today. Id. The basis for the stance of Eby is that the 1854 Texas Constitution adopted
prior to the present Texas Constitution addressed only the right of the state to adopt general
policy of assisting privately owned schools. Id. Eby writes: "[The 1845 Constitution] did not
propose free tuition for all children or the principle of general taxation for popular education
or a system of state-owned and supported schools. The advocates of private and church
schools fully expected the State to assist in promoting their particular enterprises." Id.; see
also 1 BRADEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 505-06 (1977) (the Texas Constitution provides only for assisting indi-

gent children and orphans to attend private schools at state expense); TEXAS STATE
TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF PROGRESS IN TEXAS EDUCATION: 1854-

1954 at 7 (1954) (Texas legislation encouraged the attendance of private church schools promoting moral structure to aid in growth of Texas); EVANS, THE STORY OF TEXAS SCHOOLS 52
(1955) (present school system would have been tyranny in 1845). The district system that was
adopted after the voucher system did not consider that the Texas property values would become drastically different and therefore created districts that were at a financial disadvantage.
Watts & Rockwell, The OriginalIntent of the EducationArticle of the Texas Constitution, 21
ST. MARY'S L.J. 771, 816 (1990). Texas was not alone in its formation of privately or locally
controlled school system in 1856. See generally, PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM
(1953) (in early America all schools were privately owned).
14. Historically, there have been voucher systems for other forms of government funded
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Educational choice, or "free choice," when including choice of public and
non-public schools, creates parental responsibility and involvement in allowing the selection of their child's primary or secondary school."5 Some
advocates of free choice believe that the selection of a school is not only an
incentive for parental involvement with their child's education, but a free
exercise right to educate their child in a religious surrounding.16 Other theorists maintain that if free choice were adopted, the resulting competition
among schools would promote efficiency in a system of state funded and

services, including government housing, day care and medical services and by corporations to
further educate employees. See Gregory, Union Leadershipand Workers' Voices. Meeting the
Needs of Linguistically Heterogeneous Union Members, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 115, 153 (1989)
(Ford Motor Company very successful with vouchers to further educate employees thereby
increasing quality and productivity); see also Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitalk- An Antitrust
Perspectiveon TraditionalRelationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1161-62 (1984) (medical assistance programs operated by voucher system). This comment will refer to the voucher system as
it pertains to providing a direct payment or tax exemption to state residents for public education reimbursement. See generally COONS & SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE
CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978); MECKLENBURGER & HoSTROP, EDUCATION VOUCHERS: FROM THEORY TO ALUM ROCK (1972); BLUM, FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN EDUCATION

(1958).
15. See generally, COONS & SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR FAMILY CONTROL (1978); BLUM, FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN EDUCATION (1958). For a voucher

system to work effectively, the choice of schools must be uninhibited. See FRIEDMAN, FREE
TO CHOOSE 150-88 (1980) (American education is island of socialism in great democracy).
Parents are free to send their child to any school that they choose and cannot be compelled to
send their child to public school. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Parents
have liberty interest under Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution to decide where their child attends school. Id. Parents must see that their children receive some
education but do not have the right to be reimbursed for choosing a private school over public
school. Id.
16. See Arons, Out of the Fire and Into the Frying Pan, I FIRST THINGS 48 (1989) (free
exercise liberty demands choice of non-public school funded by state); see also, WISHY,

PREFACES TO LIBERTY 236 (1859) (asserting that public schools stifle plurality). John Stuart
Mill stated:
[State-sponsored education] ... is a mere contrivance for molding people to be exactly
like one another: and as the mold in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and
successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind.
Id. It is difficult to define what is meant by "religion." In an often cited article, Dean Choper
wrote, "the scope of religious pluralism in the United States alone has resulted in such a multiplicity and diversity of ideas about what is a 'religion' or a 'religious belief' that no simple
formula seems able to accommodate them all." Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First
Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 579, 579 (1982). Cf Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to be
Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REv. 247, 288 n.106 (1984) (not all "religions" are based on concept of
a one creator or god). See generally, Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw,
72 CALIF. L. REv. 753 (1984) (expressing difficulty in separating religion from philosophy or
ideology).
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17
privately chosen education.
While free choice is presently debated as a viable solution to the need for
educational reform,1 8 one major obstacle that must be broached is the possibility that educational choice would lower the wall between church and state
when sectarian schools participating in the "choice" program take the state's

educational dollar.19 This comment recognizes the urgent need for free

choice of both public and non-public schools within a state and suggests a
practical solution to the conflict raised by free choice between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.20

17. See GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 91, 146-49 (1981) (good intentions of socialism destroy motivation and efficiency of schools); FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE 150 (1980)
(competition would cure education system problems); FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85-107 (1962) (free choice in education is fundamental to rights of Americans); see also
CHUBB AND MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, & AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990). But see Solet, Educational Vouchers:An Inquiry andAnalysis, 1 J. OF L. & EDUC. 303 (1972); THAYER, AN END
To HIERARCHY! AN END To COMPETITION, 81 (1973) (freemarket competition leads to
waste); Wall Street Journal, May 2, 1991, at A19. See generally, CHUBB AND MOE, EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: ANSWERS TO THE MOST FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT MEDI-

ocRrny IN AMERICAN EDUCATION AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (1990) (copy on file
with St. Mary's Law Journal).
18. See e.g., Wall Street Journal, Sept. 4, 1990, at Al (Wisconsin state legislator Polly
Williams interviewed on pros and cons of vouchers); San Antonio Express News, July 3, 1990,
at A3 (fear exists that public is incapable of choosing school for their children).
19. See Note, The IncreasingJudicialRationalefor EducationalChoice: Mueller, Witters
and Vouchers 66 WASH. U.L.Q. 363, 372-84 (1988) (free exercise would allow sectarian
schools to participate in voucher system); Runnels, The Constitutionalityof LouisianaAid to
Private Education, 44 LA. L. REv. 865, 869 (1984) (discussion of free exercise clause pertaining to education). On a federal level, it has been suggested that an educational voucher system
would not violate the U.S. Constitution's prohibition of direct aid by states to sectarian schools
due to the interpretation of the free exercise clause. Id. The Texas Constitution clearly prohibits direct state funding to sectarian schools. The Texas Constitution Article VII § 5(a)
states:

The available school fund shall be applied annually to the support of the public free
schools. Except as provided by this section, no law shall ever be enacted appropriating
any part of the permanent or available school fund to any other purpose whatever; nor
shall the same, or any part thereof ever be appropriated to or used for the support of any
sectarian school; and the available school fund herein provided shall be distributed to the
several counties according to their scholastic population and applied in such manner as
may be provided by law.
TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 5(a). Further, the Bill of Rights of the Texas Constitution supports
§ 5(a): "No money shall be appropriated, or drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of any
sect, or religious society, theological or religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the
State be appropriated for any such purposes." TEX. CONST. art. I, § 7.
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (religion clauses). The First Amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
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II.

EDUCATIONAL CHOICE

A. Public v. Public and PrivateSchool Choice
Currently, all the states afford parents at least one form of educational
choice. Parents may reside or relocate in the school district of their choice
and enroll their children in the public schools of that district. Unfortunately, the cost of housing in the desired district may inhibit free exercise of
this alternative, thereby reserving the right for the affluent.21 Choice among
only the public schools within the state of residence, regardless of districts, is
another form of educational choice. In the majority of proposed choice programs currently promulgated by states,22 the selection of institutions is limited to exclusively public schools within the state, or public and secular nonpublic institutions.23 The reasons behind limiting the scope of such legisla-

tion to only public schools result from the fear of state educators that parents will abandon the ineffective public school system if given the
opportunity, the fears of school board administrators that their jobs will no
longer be needed,24 and the belief that lack of transportation in lower income
Id. There are many unsettled areas of establishment clause jurisprudence, including the consitutionlity of utilizing free choice concepts in the state school system. See, Johnson, The Religious Clauses Article Concepts and Compromises in FirstAmendment Religious Doctrine, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 817, 821 (1984) (listing proposed educational choice system including sectarian schools as one unsettled area of religion clause conflicts).
21. See Gallup, Do Most Americans PreferPrivateSchools? 1986 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 3.
Of 1,552 adults sampled from all the states in the U.S. in 1986, 49% of parents with children
enrolled in public school would prefer to send their children to a private or sectarian school,
but could not due to a lack of finances. Id. In 1986, 87% of primary and secondary school
children attended public school. Id. In 1990, those who supported educational choice of private or public school increased to 72% of minorities and to 62% of the general public in the
United States. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 21, 1991, at 8, col. C; Nat'l J., Nov. 3, 1990, at 2671.
22. Gannett News Service, Sept. 18, 1990, at 1. Educational choice is currently utilized
in Minnesota, Wisconsin, Washington, New York, Arkansas, Iowa, Nebraska, and Ohio. Id.
In Milwaukee, 400 students of low-income families are currently attending schools of their
choice with $2,500 grants from the state. Id. In November of 1990, Oregon residents voted
down Measure 11, which would have implemented a comprehensive educational choice plan.
Id. For over a decade, families in Milwaukee, Wisconsin have been allowed to choose any
public school under an open enrollment plan. Id.
23. See Gannett News Service, Sept. 14, 1990, at 6. One of the most publicized Choice
programs was implemented in 1990 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where State Representative
Polly Williams pushed through legislation engaging a voucher system for only very low-income families to redeem with non-sectarian non-public schools. Gannett News Service, Sept.
10, 1990, at 4. Up to 1,000 Milwaukee children can participate in the trial program, receiving
$2,500 a year in state tax funds. See id. (first contemporary choice program including private
sectarian schools); see also Gannett News Service, May 25, 1990, at 12 (Springfield, Illinois
adopts public school choice program).
24. DAVIS & HAYES, EFFICIENCY AND INEFFICIENCY IN THE TEXAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

(1990) (copy on file with St. Mary's Law Journal). Fifty-one percent of the individuals presently employed by the Texas public school system are not teachers. NAT'L CENTER FOR
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areas will eliminate any true choice of schools.2 5 Uninhibited by the concerns of those who oppose free choice, an Oregon organization 26 responded
to that state's inefficient and ineffective public school system by proposing
Measure Eleven. 27 This act attempted to create a free choice educational
system for the state of Oregon.2 8 The proposition failed in a November,
1990 election due to an underfinanced campaign and multi-million dollar
opposition by Oregon school boards that did not want to see non-public
schools receive any of the state's education funds.2 9 Possibly the prototype
for choice reform legislation, the ambitious Oregon proposal called for reimbursement of the educational expenditures made by the parents through tax
deductions or a voucher system.3" Although Measure Eleven only garnered
PoL'Y ANALYSIS, CHOICE IN EDUCATION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR TEXAS 4 (1990). Opposition

by currently employed public school administrators is apparent in the over two million dollars
spent by school boards in lobbying against a free choice bill promulgated by Oregonians for
Educational Choice. Gannett News Service, Sept. 14, 1990 at 1.
25. See Rose-Ackerman, SocialServices and the Market, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1405, 1429
(1983) (voucher plans do not allow choice if participants are immobile).
26. Oregonians For Educational Choice, P.O. Box 40748, Portland, Oregon 97240, (503)
242-0080.
27. See Appendix A infra.
28. See School Board News, August 28, 1990, at I (reasons why Choice is opposed in
Oregon).
29. Id. Alan Tresidder, a lobbyist for the school boards of Oregon stated, "The $67 Million loss estimate [to the public schools] is too conservative; schools will lose at least $100
million in the first year, if this is approved .... We are very much opposed to the proposed
measure." Id. Measure Eleven would indeed have shifted money out of the public school
system if parents chose not to place their children there. See generally OREGONIANS FOR
EDUCATIONAL CHOICE, QUESTIONS AND ANSwERs ABoUT MEASURE ELEVEN (1990) (copy
on fie with St. Mary's Law Journal). Fear of Measure Eleven by the Oregonian school board
appears to originate in the fact that the measure would be effective in creating efficient schools
and relieve districts from the need for school administrators and school boards. See id.
30. For example, a state educational voucher system establishes a uniform property tax
which is collected statewide based on local property. The tax revenue presently collected annually by most states is sufficient for the voucher system to operate successfully without the
need for a property tax rate increase. The funds are then held by the State Comptroller. Each
individual domiciled in the state receives a per capita allocation of the tax revenue held by the
State Comptroller based child's category of need. Categories are general and specific, with the
specific categories including physically and mentally handicapped children, children born with
drug addictions, and gifted children. Allowing children to attend special schools that cater to
specific needs encourages the formation of "boutique" schools. Parental choice would encourage smaller schools to form by specialist in a particular area of education, expanding and
receding with the social needs of the Texas population. The concept of "boutique" schools for
special student populations is a concept promoted by Allan E. Parker, Associate Professor of
Law at St. Mary's Law School in his Equal Opportunity/Free Choice Education Plan. See,
Appendix B infra. In order for the participating schools to receive a child's allocation of funds
for education, they may have to meet certain requirements, such as: (1) making academic tests
scores available to the public for comparison, (2) allowing admission of students by lottery if
there are more applicants than positions for enrollment (the use of the lottery allows equal
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thirty percent of the vote, the failure of the legislative proposal may have
resulted from a lack of voter understanding and the fact that Measure
Eleven did not include provisions for transportation to and from the schools
chosen. Nevertheless, the stage has been set for states to recast Measure
Eleven in a form that will accommodate their specific state's concerns and
take full advantage of the free market3 1 and free exercise32 principles inherent in free choice.33
B. Free Market Theory
Free market theorist Milton Friedman once said that public education in
America is like a socialist island in a sea of democracy.3 4 To bring education
into the democratic scheme, the free market theory for education reform
envisions the removal of the centralized bureaucracy surrounding public education by facilitating parental choice of public and non-public schools.35
opportunity for enrollment. After initial enrollment by a student in a school, the child has
priority over new applicants for enrollment in order to promote continuity in the school's
student population), and (3) agreeing not to charge any additional fee beyond the per capita
allotment by the state for each student if the school accepts any state allocation of funds (states
who propose this requirement of institutions fear the affluent will drive the costs of education
out of the reach of many individuals by adding on cost to the state allocation). Schools which
do not wish to participate in the voucher system would be free to charge any tuition rate and
would not be limited by the proposed legislation.
31. See FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE page 96-118 (1980) (free market economics demand choice for efficiency in education). See generally, CHUBB & MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS,
& AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990) (proposal for reform of public school system in U.S. allowing
free choice of all institutions to create free market economy).
32. See Axons, Out of the Fireand Into the FryingPan, FIRST THINGS 48 (1991) (choice
in education is necessary for free exercise right not economic utility). See generally, ARONS,
COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING (1988).
33. See, Gallup, The 22nd Annual Gallup Poll of Public's Attitudes Toward the Public
Schools, 22 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 65 (1990) (support for voucher system increased 10% in last
year). Public opinion of Free Choice reform of state schools has made a substantial shift since
the last campaign for reform in the early 1970's.
34. See FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE 150-88 (1980) (public school system's poor performance curable by competition); FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85-107 (1962)

(socialism in education creates poor schools). But see THAYER, AN END TO HIERARCHY! AN
END TO COMPETITION 81-115 (1973) (competition is road to waste and not efficiency); Ginzberg, The Economics of the VoucherSystem, 72 TCHRS. C. REc. 373 (1971) (opposing voucher
system); Seldon, Vouchers-Solution or Sop?, 72 TCHRS. C. REC. 365 (1971) (vouchers would
ruin public school system).
35. See GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 91, 146-49 (1981) (liberalism destroys the educational system by excess bureaucracy); see also MCGARRY & WARD, EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM AND THE CASE FOR GOVERNMENT AID TO STUDENTS IN INDEPENDENT SCHOOLS 12237 (1966) (free market naturally creates better schools at lower costs). Free market theorist

John J. McDonough advocates free market for the benefit of competitive economy. Id. at 12224. McDonough proposed a "taxpayers' savings plan" utilizing economy of government aid to

independent education, in which he stated:
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By allowing parents the freedom to select the school their child attends, public and non-public schools would have to compete for attendance, and
thereby, compete for state education funds.3 6 Poorly managed schools

would be forced to cease operations due to lack of attendance,3 7 allowing the
superior schools to prosper.3 ' The free market argument for education re-

form was made convincingly by those advocating reform in the early 1970's,
but was not made in the atmosphere of urgency which currently surrounds
state legislatures since the Edgewood decision.

9

C. Free Exercise Theory
Unlike the free market theory which relies on economic motives, the free
exercise theory emphasizes the freedom of belief and intellect guaranteed by
the First Amendment as the rationale for adopting free choice, and thereby,
The "free market" naturally develops in our American way of life, with millions of Americans each day freely selecting their goods and services on the basis of each individual's
personal preferences. This provides many choices, responding to the needs and desires of
individuals, and gives us prompt recourse against inefficiency, unsatisfactory goods and
services, or ones that do not fill our desires and needs. In the free market, multitudes of
individual decisions are ceaselessly taking place on thousands of fronts .... The objective
of our nation's founders was the formation of a central political establishment which
would foster free choice and the free market in all aspects of life.
Id.
36. See FRIEDMAN, CAPTIALISM AND FREEDOM 85-107 (1962) (freedom to choose

school would create efficiency in education); LAHAYE, BATTLE FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
HUMANISM'S THREAT TO OUR CHILDREN 69 (1973) (free market private education system
would be superior to public schools system). See generally, Coons & Sugarman, Vouchersfor
Public Schools, 15 INEQUALITY IN EDUC. 60 (1973) (vouchers create equality among disadvantaged); Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Recreatingthe Family'sRole in Education, in NEW MODELS FOR AMERICAN EDUCATION 216 (1971) (choice allows parental involvement); COONS &
SUGARMAN, FAMILY CHOICE IN EDUCATION:

A MODEL STATE SYSTEM FOR VOUCHERS

(1971) (description of working state voucher system model for choice in education); COONS,
CLUNE & SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970) (inequity of cur-

rent state education systems).

37. See FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85-107 (1962) (freedom to choose
school would create efficiency in education).
38. See MECKLENBURGER & HOsTROP, EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS: FROM THEORY TO

ALUM ROCK 24-32 (1972) (analysis of four ways competition and vouchers could work).
39. See Edgewood v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (financing of education plan in
Texas is unconstitutional). In addition to the Edgewood decision, the increasing cost of public
education coupled with a nation-wide decline in Scholastic Aptitude Test scores and increased
drop out rates has created a new atmosphere for the resurgence of interest in the free market
theory for education reform. See generally, CHUBB & MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, &
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990) (data from Brookings Institution on inefficiency and ineffectiveness of school system without choice). In addition, political groups historically opposed to
choice in education agree that free market theory could benefit all economic classes and improve education in the public schools. The Nation, Mar. 4, 1991, at 1, col. 2 (not just conservatives could benefit from educational choice).
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assures the free exercise of beliefs.' In 1859, John Stuart Mill forewarned of
this stifling of liberty interests by expounding upon the imminent threat from

state organized schools.4 1 Mill stated that state run schools rob parents and
their children of thoughts and beliefs due to the "molding effect" of centralized administration and curriculum. 42 Sometimes referred to as "secular humanism," 4 3 public schools are often accused of violating constitutional
rights" by endorsing a type of religion which is based on the exclusion or
active neutrality toward all religions.4" The constitutional right of parents to
receive reimbursement for privately educating their children in religious institutions has been the subject of litigation in the lower courts, but has not as

yet, been heard by the United States Supreme Court.'" However, the Court

40. See generally, Mitchell, Secularism in PublicEducation: The ConstitutionalIssues, 67
B.U.L. REv. 603 (1987) (whether public schools are infringing on free exercise rights); LAHAYE, THE BATTLE FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: HUMANIsM's THREAT TO OUR CHILDREN

(1983) (secularism as a religion in itself infringes on free exercise beliefs).
41. WIsHY, PREFACES TO LIBERTY 236 (1859).
42. Id.
43. See Smith v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 693 (11th Cir. 1987) (text-books
found not to establish secular humanism); Grove v. Mead School Dist., 753 F.2d 1528, 1534
(9th Cir. 1985) (text-book found not to promote secular humanism); Wright v. Houston Indep.
School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974) (public school's teaching of evolution did not establish
secularism).
44. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 581 (1987); (Torcaso Court did refer to "secular humanism" as a religion); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (unconstitutional
for state to force individual to subscribe to any religion); see also Freund, PublicAid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1680, 1689-91 (1969) (discussion of whether religion and
secular education can be separated); CONFEY, SECULARISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 5,
n.2 (1931) (Catholic University dissertation distinguishing secular from secularistic).
45. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (public schools do not have show
hostility toward religion to create religion of secularism). Justice Goldberg remarked in his
concurrence in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp;
It is said, and I agree, that the attitude of government toward religion must be one of
neutrality. But untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to invocation or
approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterference and noninvolvement
with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive
devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not only not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited
by it.
374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
46. See Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 850, 861 (1st Cir. 1980)
(religious institutions do not have right to education funding from state); Jackson v. California,
460 F.2d 282, 283 (9th Cir. 1972) (free exercise clause does not entitle private school compensation from state). The function of the religion clauses has become more debated due to the
application of the religion clauses to the state through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the increased government control over states, and the changes in the function of religion in American society. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 812
(1978) (apparent conflicts of the religion clauses); Johnson, Concepts and Compromisein First
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has implied that public schools fail to remain "value neutral," and limit beliefs and expressions that are protected by the free exercise clause. 7 In addition, the Court has held that because "the child is not a mere creature of the
state," families have the right to choose an alternative to public school.4"
Unfortunately, this right has become largely unexercised due to the prohibitive burden of financing a child's non-public education without state assistance.4 9 Therefore, the advocates of the free exercise theory support state
funding of private education in order to promote a separation of school and
state, allowing fundamental political, religious, and human rights to
flourish."
III.
A.

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

History of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence

In the same breath, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides all citizens the right to be free from laws that establish religion
and the right to freely exercise their religious beliefs. 1 While the framers'
intent clearly seems to keep the federal government from interfering with the
prosperity of all religions, the brevity of the Establishment and Free Exercise
clauses leaves them vulnerable to varied interpretations, resulting in no
steadfast boundary52 between church and state.5 3 Although it is relatively
Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 817, 827-28 (1984) (discussion of increased
complexity of the balance of religion clauses of U.S. Constitution).
47. See Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (public schools do not
remain value-neutral and promote varied social, moral and political values).
48. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating Oregon law
which required all students attend public schools). The Court's holding in Pierce was reinforced by Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
49. See Arons, Out of the Fire and Into the Frying Pan, 1990 FIRsT THINGS 50 (1990)
(contrast of free exercise and free market approach to choice reform).
50. Id. The right of individuals to worship in their various institutions has been supported by the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Douglas stated: "We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (opinion of Douglas, J.); Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694-712 (1984) (dissent of Justice
Brennan recognizing the religious nature of our society as a given).
51. The first amendment to the U.S. Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
52. In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court stated that a "wall of separation" must
exist between church and state. Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The phrase was coined by Roger
Williams who intended the phrase to mean the government should not intrude on individuals'
rights to their own religious beliefs. The Court in Everson used the phrase as an analogy to a
tool of the government, and not a shield of the people. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 5-10 (1965).
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settled that the Establishment Clause encompasses the doctrine of political
noninvolvement 54 and the import of individual liberty to worship without
constraint,55 the United States Supreme Court has at times been supportive
of unusual religious practices and at other times taken all requisite precautions to avoid government assistance to a particular religion.56 As a result of
the dim demarcation between church and state, state legislation promulgat-

53. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (Court acknowledges that there
are many blurred areas between church and state); see also Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980) (establishment clause issues difficult to determine); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971) (establishment clause jurisprudence is not clear). See generally, West, Constitutional Judgment on Non-Public School Aid- Fresh Guidelines or New
Roadblocks?, 35 EMORY L.J. 795 (1986) (analyzing the Supreme Court's decisions regarding
establishment clause after 1980).
54. See Giannella,Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,and DoctrinalDevelopment Part
II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REv. 513, 516-22 (1968) (political
noninvolvement and voluntarism are values protected by the establishment clause); see also
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (worship is part of American culture).
55. See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313 (examples of religion in American traditions). In Zorach,
the Court stated:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee
the freedom to worship as one chooses.... We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the
zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
Id See also Note, Government Neutrality andSeparatingChurchandState, 92 HARv. L. REV.
696, 697 (1979) (political noninvolvement is fundamental to voluntarism in religion).
56. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 411 (1963) (employment compensation
benefits not withheld from employee whose religion would not allow labor on Saturdays) with
Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973) (invalidating statute which in
effect assisted sectarian education in non-public schools) and McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 231-32 (1948) (invalidating statute which allowed sectarian instruction in public
schools). The severely muddled guidelines are expounded upon by Chief Justice Rehnquist:
[A] State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that contain maps of
the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the United States for use in geography class. A State may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend
a film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in history class. A State may
lend classroom workbooks, but may not lend workbooks in which the parochial school
children write, thus rending them non-reusable. A State may pay for bus transportation
to religious schools but may not pay for bus transportation from the parochial school to
the public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip. A State may pay for diagnostic
services conducted in the parochial school but therapeutic services must be given in a
different building; speech and hearing 'services' conducted by the State inside the sectarian school are forbidden, but the State may conduct speech and hearing diagnostic testing
inside the sectarian school. Exceptional parochial school students may receive counseling, but must take place outside of the parochial school, such as in a trailer parked down
the street. A State may give cash to a parochial school to pay for the administration of
state-written tests and state-ordered reporting services, but it may not provide funds for
teacher-prepared tests on secular subjects. Religious instruction may not be given in public school, but the public school may release students during the day for religion classes
elsewhere, and may enforce attendance at those classes with its truancy laws.
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ing a free choice system which includes sectarian schools is not certain to
survive constitutional scrutiny, if challenged.5 7
Some boundaries of establishment clause jurisprudence were fashioned,
however, by Everson v. Boardof Education,58 in which the Court applied the
Establishment Clause to the states through the doctrine of selective incorporation under the Fourteenth Amendment.59 In Everson, the Court upheld a
New Jersey statute6o which reimbursed all parents for expenses incurred in
the transportation of their children to sectarian and secular schools.6 1 Fol-

Wallace v. Jaffee, 472 U.S. 38, 115 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes
omitted).

57. Johnson, The Religious Clauses Article: Concepts and Compromise in the First
Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. Rlv. 817, 819 (1984). The U.S. Supreme Court
decisions regarding establishment clause jurisprudence reflect the "internal tension" between
the establishment clause and the free exercise clause. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677
(1971).

58. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
59. Id. at 18.
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18 A:39-1 (West 1989). The New Jersey statute states:
Whenever in any district there are pupils residing remote from any schoolhouse, the
board of education of the district may make rules and contracts for the transportation of
such pupils to and from school, including the transportation of school pupils to and from
school other than a public school, except such school as is operated for profit in whole or
in part. When any school district provides any transportation for public school pupils to
and from school pursuant to this section, transportation shall be supplied to school pupils
residing in such school district in going to and from any remote school other than a public
school, not operated for profit in whole or in part, located within the State not more than
20 miles from the residence of the pupil.
Id.
61. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. Prior to Everson in 1947, establishment clause case law was
much less definitive. The Court had upheld an agreement between a Roman Catholic hospital
and the federal government in Bradfieldv. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 300 (1899). The government
was to assist with the financial obligation of building a wing on the Catholic hospital for hospital care for indigents. Id. at 293-94. In 1908, the Court found that congressional expenditures
from a trust fund to support mission schools on Indian reservations did not violate the establishment clause. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 81-82 (1908). After Everson was
decided, two schools of analysis were born out of the conflict between what was and was not
aid to religion. See Monaghan & Ariens, Mueller v. Allen: A FairerApproach to the Establishment Clause, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 115, 142-43 (1984) (Mueller correctly decided although did
not address free exercise clause). The methodology of strict neutrality advances the concept
that if government legislation is religiously neutral, and incidentally aids a religious sect, the
statute does not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. From this perspective, state tax exemptions to foster more efficient and effective education may include sectarian schools if the aid is
given to all participants. See KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 80-85 (1962), P. Kurland,

Of Church andState and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHi. L. REv. 1, 70-72 (1961). However,
the dichotomy of strict neutrality is strict no-aid, advocated by individuals who would not
allow any financial benefit to sectarian schools under legislation, even if the statute gave state
benefits equally to all regardless of religious affiliation. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM, 533-36 (1967); Pfeffer, Book Review, 15 STAN. L. REV. 389, 400-1 (1963). The first case
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lowing Everson, the Court also found that laws requiring closing on Sundays
had a secular purpose and were therefore constitutional, and that a daily
nondenominational prayer in public school was unconstitutional.6 2 The limitations on state advancement of religion in education were further defined
by the Court's holding in Board of Education of Central School District
Number I v. Allen,6 3 in which a New York statute" allowing a state to loan
textbooks to all children was upheld against an establishment clause chal-

concerning the establishment clause of religion after Everson was McCullum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (unconstitutional to release public school children from school
to receive religious instruction). McCullum followed the strict no-aid concept of Everson. Id.
In 1952, the Court in Zorach v. Clauson held that public school children could leave school to
receive religious instruction during the school day since the school was not providing the instruction and incurred no expenditure in the releasing of the children. Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 308-15 (1952). Zorach has been interpreted as diluting the strict no-aid concept of
McCullum and criticized for broadening the meaning of strict neutrality. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONsTruTION 67-79 (1964); Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and DoctrinalDevelopment: PartI. The NonestablishmentPrinciple, 81 HARV. L. REv. 513,
530-31 (1968).
62. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (invalidating state statute formulating
prayer for public schools). The Court also interpreted the establishment clause to forbid Bible
readings and recitations of the Lord's Prayer in public school. See Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (invalidating statute requiring recitation of prayer in public
school).
63. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
64. 1950 N.Y. Laws ch. 239, §§ 1, 3. Section 703 of the New York Education Law allowed qualified school district voters to authorize a tax that would make available free textbooks. § 701 states:
1. In the several cities and school districts of the state, boards of education, trustees or
such body or officer as perform the functions of such boards, shall designate text-books to
be used in the schools under their charge.
2. A text-book, for the purpose of this section shall mean a book which a pupil is required to use as a text for a semester or more in a particular class in the school he legally
attends.
3. In the several cities and school districts of the state, boards of education, trustees or
such body or officers as perform the function of such boards shall have the power and
duty to purchase and to loan upon individual request, to all children residing in such
district who are enrolled in grades seven to twelve of a public or private school which
complies with the compulsory education law, text-books. Text-books loaned to children
enrolled in grades seven to twelve of said private schools shall be text-books which are
designated for use in any public, elementary or secondary schools of the state or are approved by any boards of education, trustees or other school authorities. Such text-books
are to be loaned free to such children subject to such rules and regulations as are or may
be prescribed be the board of regents and such boards of education, trustees or other
school authorities.
N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 701 (Supp. 1967). Subdivision two was added in 1966 by amendment.
1966 N.Y. Laws 795. The Allen trial court decision was rendered prior to the 1966 amendment. Allen, 392 U.S. at 241-44.
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lenge.65 In Allen, the statute stated that its purpose was purely secular in
scope 66 and was to expand the educational opportunities of all children in
the state.6 7
B.

The Lemon v. Kurtzman Test

Relying on the guidelines set forth in their previous decisions, the Court
developed the three prong test of Lemon v. Kurtzman6 8 which is presently
applied by the Court to analyze establishment clause challenges. 69 The three
part Lemon 71 test requires (1) that the statute in question have a secular
purpose,7 1 (2) that the principle or primary effect of the statute does not
advance nor inhibit religion, 7' and (3) that the statute does not foster an

65. Allen, 392 U.S. at 249.
66. Id. at 243. Because the books remained the property of the state, the religious schools
did not benefit from the program of loaning textbooks. Id.
67. Id. at 243.
68. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, a statute allowing reimbursement to sectarian
schools for the cost of secular text-books and instructional materials did not survive establishment clause challenges. Id. The Lemon analysis has been utilized by the Court repeatedly in
establishment clause challenges to legislation concerning grants, tax credits, or text-book
loans. See, eg., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 575 (1989) (religious holiday display maintained by city violates establishment clause); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 6 (1989) (statute allowing religious periodicals exemption from sales and use tax invalidated); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 393 (1983) (statute providing tax deduction for education expenses upheld as having secular purpose); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (state colleges cannot bar students
use of class space for religious worship); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 235 (1977) (statute
which made state responsible for standardized tests at non-public schools upheld); Roemer v.
Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 740 (1976) (grants to schools including religious
institutions upheld); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975) (statute authorizing textbook loan to non-public school not allowed); Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 1021, 1021 (1973)
(tuition tax credit upheld with no analysis by the Court); Levitt v. Committee For Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 481 (1973) (sectarian schools reimbursed for services such
as student health costs); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789-90 (1973)
(tuition grants and deductions to parents of children in private school invalidated).
69. The most recent application of the Lemon test by the court was County of Allegheny
v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter 492 U.S. 573, 575 (1989) (religious holiday display maintained by city violates establishment clause).
70. Justice Rehnquist added the caveat that the Lemon test was used only as a helpful
signpost in dealing with establishment clause challenges. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394.
71. The secular purpose prong of Lemon was originally promulgated by Professor Philip
Kurland. See Kurland, Of Church And State And The Supreme Court, 29 U. CHl. L. REv. 1,
96 (1961) (legislation must state secular purpose); see also KuRLAND, RELIGION AND THE
LAW 80-85 (1962) (factors used to determine whether statute is secular in purpose); Note,
EstablishmentClause Analysis ofLegislative and Administrative Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 1175, 1179 (1974) (three ways the court has determined if statute had secular purpose).
72. The Court in Abington School District v. Schempp added the "primary effect" analysis to what was to become the Lemon test. See Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (Court
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"excessive government entanglement with religion." 73 With the newly for-

mulated test at their disposal, the Court proceeded to determine whether
non-public colleges could receive federal funding for new buildings,7 4
whether non-public schools could be reimbursed for mandatory state testing
and record keeping," whether counseling, special therapies, and special education could be state funded,76 and whether religious publications could be

deemed tax exempt by a state when no other publications received the tax
exemption.7 7
Because of the large number of sectarian schools in the United States and
the resulting shift of state educational funds to those religious institutions
under the free choice plan, constitutional challenges to the legislation will
probably arise.78 Unless replaced before the Court grants certiorari to hear a
inquired as to purpose and "primary effect" of the statute). However, the primary effect element contributed by Schempp was limited considerably by the Court's holding in Mueller
when Justice Rehnquist stated that the secular purpose of legislation should be determined by
looking at the statute's face, not inquiring into its resulting effect. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401-02.
73. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
74. See Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 740 (1976) (upholding statute of non-public college grants); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 938 (1973) (statute granting
funds for construction of religious non-public school upheld); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 809 (1971) (federal grants allowed to non-public sectarian college).
75. See Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 474-76
(1973) (state cannot reimburse sectarian non-public schools for mandatory state testing). But
see Committee For Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 948, 948-49 (1979)
(upholding statute paying non-public schools for correcting state performance tests).
76. See Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975) (invalidating statute that funded special education services to non-public schools).
77. See generallyTexas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 6 (1989) (invalidating statute giving tax exemption to religious publications).
78. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 768 (1973) (most non-public
schools in New York are sectarian). In 1973, 85% of all non-public school students in New
York attended sectarian schools. Id. In 1971, 96% of non-public school students in Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania attended Roman Catholic or other sectarian schools. Lemon, 403
U.S. at 610. The most recent application of the Lemon analysis is also the broadest. It was the
alleged establishment clause infraction examined in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). In Allegheny, a courthouse in downtown Pittsburgh which
had placed a Christian nativity scene at top of the main public stairway of the courthouse, and
an eighteen foot Jewish Chanukah menorah in front of the courthouse. Id. at 588. The District Court refused to grant an injunction to remove the displays, relying on Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984). The Lynch Court held that a creche as used in a city Christmas display
was did not support or promote any religious affiliation, but instead accommodated what had
become a cultural phenomenon of Christmas. Id. at 672-687. The Court urged that such
displays as the creche in Lynch are part of American culture and play a role in the history of
society in the U.S. Id. at 674-78. In Allegheny, the district court decision was reversed by the
court of appeals, which distinguished Allegheny from Lynch by applying the Lemon test. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 588. Granting certiorari, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part,
holding that because the creche in Allegheny contained a signboard suggesting that onlookers
"praise God for the birth of Jesus," the display could be distinguished from the neutral display
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challenge to free choice legislation, the Lemon test will most assuredly be
applied by the Court.7 9 In addition to the Lemon analysis, the Court will
also view the state statute providing free choice in the light of Mueller v.
Allen,8 0 which set the parameters of establishment clause jurisprudence in
the area of tuition tax credits.81
C. Mueller v. Allen
When Mueller was decided in 1983, some legal scholars predicted that the
foundation had been laid for future state legislatures to attempt a much
needed reform of the public school system with free choice.82 Prior United
States Supreme Court cases holding that state tuition tax credits were unconstitutional failed to provide an analysis for the decision" or were based on
distinguishable facts, 84 thereby reserving the issue for the Court in Mueller. 5 The statute at issue in Mueller was a Minnesota law8 6 which permitted
of a creche among other holiday symbols in Lynch. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 588 (distinguishing Lynch from the facts of the case). By so holding, the Court expanded the second
Lemon prong forbidding a governmental practice that has a principal or primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (noting that Court expanded primary effects test to include any government support for a religion). Under Allegheny interpretation of the Lemon test, a government practice which shows public recognition of an established religion, indorses, shows
preference, or promotes a specific religion will be in direct violation of the establishment
clause. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (primary effects test now
too broad). Justice Kennedy claims the court is callously indifferent to religion in the U.S. and
is discarding part of our social and political history. Id.
79. See Comment, Is Lemon a Lemon? Crosscurrentsin Contemporary Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence,22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 129, 133-34 (1990) (potential for new standard to
replace Lemon).
80. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
81. See id. at 404 (tuition tax credit statute upheld because afforded to all).
82. See Monaghan & Ariens, Mueller v. Allen: A FairerApproach to the Establishment
Clause, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 115, 116 (1984) (educational choice funds now available to sectarian schools under Mueller). States including New York, Rhode Island, and Hawaii had all
attempted to pass tuition tax credits prior to Mueller, but had failed or the statutes had been
struck down. Id.
83. See Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901, 901 (1973) (affirming district court opinion without reason); Essex v. Wolman, 419 U.S. 820, 820 (1972) (memorandum decision affirming
district court decision).
84. The plaintiffs in Mueller relied on Nyquist to allege that the establishment clause was
violated by the statute at issue. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 393. However, the statute in Nyquist
granted tuition tax credits only to parents of children enrolled in private schools. See Nyquist,
413 U.S. at 797-98 (statute violated establishment clause due to limitation of availability of
funds to public school participants).
85. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began the
Mueller opinion by stating that the Nyquist Court had intentionally reserved the issue of educational tax credits for both public and non-public school expenses. Id. at 390-91.
86. MINN. STAT. § 290.09 (1982).
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taxpayers to claim a gross income deduction in computing their state tax
liability to abate the cost of their childrens' primary and secondary school
education. 7 The educational expenditures for which tax deductions were
allowed included textbooks, transportation, tuition, and teaching materials."8 While Mueller was being decided by the Court in 1983, ninety-five
percent of the students attending non-public schools in Minnesota were attending sectarian schools.8 9 Petitioners were Minnesota taxpayers, alleging
the statute violated the establishment clause by providing financial aid to
sectarian schools.' The state's motion for summary judgment was granted
by the district court, which held "that the statute was neutral on its face and
in its application and does not have a primary effect of either advancing or
inhibiting religion." 91 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision and found that the Minnesota statute
was facially neutral and assisted a
92
citizens."
Minnesota
of
class
"broad
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide what would
become a landmark in establishment clause jurisprudence. After Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized what an onerous task it is to "perceive the lines of
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law," he
employed the Lemon test in his analysis of the Minnesota statute.93 In applying the first prong of the Lemon analysis, 94 the Court found that the Minnesota statute had a secular purpose and was similar to prior governmental
assistance programs that have survived constitutional muster. 95 The Court
disposed of the third prong of Lemon in a similarly abbreviated manner by
comparing Mueller to Board ofEducation v. Allen, in which the Court found
that a state statute which required officials to determine if text-books were of
a secular nature did not "excessively entangle" the state with religion.96 Ap-

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396 (describing Minnesota statute).
MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982).
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 391.
Id. at 392.
Id. at 392 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (D. Minn. 1981)).

92. Id. at 292 (citing Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1205 (8th Cir. 1982)).
93. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 393; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 761 (quoting Lemon concerning difficulty of establishment clause issues); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (difficult
to distinguish line between church and state).
94. The Lemon test employed by the Mueller Court in 1983 was narrower than the one

used previously in the Allegheny decision in 1989, which raised the wall separating church and
state slightly higher. Compare Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401-402 (1983) (indirect financial assistance to sectarian schools not endorsing religion) with County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 599 (1989) (display of religious symbols by county
courthouse is alone enough to promote religion and violate establishment clause).

95. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394.
96. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 403. The Court noted that in earlier Supreme Court decisions,
state involvement with a text-book loan program to determine if books were of a secular nature
was not in violation of the establishment clause. Id. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
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plication of the second prong of the Lemon test in Mueller produced an
unprecedented result. Chief Justice Rehnquist brought to the forefront the
specific facet of the Minnesota statute that safeguarded it from invalidation:
the statute provided that the deduction for education expenses was available
for educational expenses incurred by all parents.9 7 In addition, Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated, "[t]he provision of benefits 98to so broad a spectrum of
groups is an important index of secular effect.",
To further solidify the newly drawn boundary between church and state,
the Court distinguished the Minnesota statute from state legislation analyzed under the Lemon analysis in prior cases, including Committeefor Public Education v. Nyquist.99 In Nyquist, financial assistance (that resulted in
what were actually tuition grants) was provided to parents of non-public
school students exclusively, in an attempt to promote pluralism and diversity
among the state's public and non-public schools."°° While the purpose of
the statute in Nyquist was a secular one, the primary effect of the legislation
was to assist only parents of children enrolled in non-public schools.' 1 The
Court in Mueller repeatedly underscored the importance of state legislation
permitting all parents to benefit from the provisions regarding tax deductions.102 Reiterating the holdings of both the district and circuit courts, the
Court maintained that the neutrality of the statute on its face and in its effect
on a broad0 3 spectrum of people guards it from an Establishment Clause
challenge.1
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens,
wrote the dissent in Mueller which emphasized the effect of the Minnesota
statute rather than its facial neutrality." ° The dissent noted that the majority of non-public schools in Minnesota were sectarian, therefore making the
statute's primary effect to facilitate religious institutions."0 5 Justice Marshall
argued that Nyquist controlled in determining the constitutionality of the
statute at issue: "[t]he Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits a State from subsidizing religious education, whether it does so di236, 249 (1968) (text book loan program not in violation of establishment clause); see also
Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 361-62 (1975) (text book loan program constitutional).
97. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401-02 (primary effect of statute does not promote religion
because all parents may deduct expenses from taxable income).
98. Id. at 397.
99. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
100. Id. at 780-89.
101. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797-98.
102. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397 (tax deduction not limited to religious non-public
school and therefore constitutional).
103. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 392-404.
104. Id. at 405-06 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 405 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss1/7

20

Cusenbary: Educational Choice Legislation after Edgewood v. Kirby: A Proposa

1991]

COMMENTS

'
rectly or indirectly. '""e
Finally, the dissent argued that the statutes at issue
in Nyquist and Mueller were indistinguishable in their effect although the
Nyquist statute provided aid to parents of non-public school students10 exclu7
sively, and the Mueller statute provides aid to all who requested it.

D.

United States Supreme Court Cases Following Mueller
1.

Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind

Following the five to four decision of Mueller, the Court aligned with
Chief Justice Rehnquist's rationale concerning who could receive state funds
for education without violating the Establishment Clause. In Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind,"08 the Court held that fi-

nancial assistance to a student of a Christian college under a Washington
vocational rehabilitation statute would not advance religion in a manner inconsistent with the Establishment Clause."0 9 In so holding, the Court emphasized that neutrally available state aid used at the receiver's discretion to
pay for religious education does not confer state endorsement of religion. 1 0
2. Board of Education of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens
In Mergens,"' the Court upheld the Equal Access Act112 which forbids
106. Id. at 404 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
107. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 408-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Marshall repeatedly relies upon the fact that although the Minnesota statute is facially neutral and
effects a broad scope of people, the fact remains that almost all of the non-public schools in the
state were at that time sectarian schools. Id. at 407-09 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
109. Id. at 489.
110. Id. at 487-89. Before Witters was decided, some legal scholars promoted the concept
that state assistance given directly to individuals who placed the assistance directly into the
hands of a religious institution is not in violation of the Establishment Clause, but rather an
employment of free exercise liberty. See Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673, 675-80 (1980) (allowing free exercise
liberty interest of school choice does not violate Establishment Clause). Justice Brennan's
dissent in Marsh v. Chambers implemented the same rationale as the majority in Witters. See
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 810 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (exceptions to separation of church and state). In Justice Brennan's dissent in Marsh, he made evident that the
Justices who take a strict separation of church and state stance when deciding establishment
clause issues make exceptions to their position for specific situations such as chaplains for the
military, providing sewer and fire protection to religiously affiliated property, public transportation to individuals attending church, and allowing tax exemptions to churches by categorizing them with other charitable and educational institutions. Id.
111. Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, - U.S. -, 110 S.
Ct. 2356, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191 (1990).
112. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a), (b) (1982). The Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial
assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity
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public secondary schools that receive federal funding and that maintain a
"limited open forum" from denying "equal access" to students who request
to meet at the school on the basis of "religious, political, philosophical, or
other content" of speech at such meetings.1 1 3 The Court relied on Widmar
v. Vincent 4 in which the Court upheld a similar policy of "equal access" as
it applied to state universities. Further, the Court interpreted the act as preserving the free exercise clause, rather than offending principals behind the
1 15
establishment clause.
IV.

LEMON ANALYSIS OF FREE CHOICE LEGISLATION

There are many obstacles to be negotiated in order for state legislation
providing free choice in education to survive under the establishment
clause. 1 6 The voucher or tax deduction relied upon in free choice provisions is subject to review under Lemon to determine if the incidental state
financial aid to sectarian schools is unconstitutional." 7 In addition, those
states defending the statute will necessarily rely on Mueller, Witters, and
Mergens to persuade the Court that the state statute has a secular purpose,
does not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and does not unneces-

to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of
the speech at such meetings.

Id. § 4071(a).
113. Mergens, - U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 2361, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 196.
114. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). The Court in Widmar applied the three-part analysis of
Lemon to determine that the Establishment Clause was not violated by an "equal access"
policy at the state university level. Id. at 275. Religious students are therefore allowed to meet
in vacant classrooms at state universities without infringing upon establishment clause rights.
Id. at 278.
115. Mergens, - U.S. at _, 110 S. Ct. at 2361, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 196. See generally
McCarthy, Students Religious Expression: Mixed Messages From the Supreme Court, 64 W.
EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1991) (historical perspective of the Mergens litigation).
116. See GAFFNEY, PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD; POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR THE EIGHTIES 165-71 (1981) (constitutional issues involved with education reform); COONS & SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE 91-108 (1978) (problems with choice in
education leading to poor education); REISCHAUER & HARTMAN, REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE 95-131 (1973) (pros and cons of public aid to non-public schools); MECKLENBURGER
& HOSTROP, EDUCATION VOUCHERS: FROM THEORY TO ALUM ROCK 24-32 (1972)
(problems with free market approach to education reform); MCGARRY & WARD, EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM AND THE CASE FOR GOVERNMENT AID TO STUDENTS IN INDEPENDENT
SCHOOLS 40-55 (1966) (discussion of rights and roles of parents, church and state in education); BLUM, FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN EDUCATION 121-42 (1958) (state can allow educational
choice and not violate establishment clause).
117. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (three-prong test to determine if
government action violates the establishment clause); see also Comment, Is Lemon a Lemon?
Crosscurrentsin ContemporaryEstablishment Clause Jurisprudence,22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 129,
133 (1990) (inherent problems with Lemon analysis).
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sadly entangle church and state.118
A.

Secular Purpose Test

The first prong of the Lemon test is whether a state's free choice plan has a
secular purpose.1 19 Considering that the statutory scheme in Nyquist passed
this prong of the test, it is apparent that a plan giving all participants an
opportunity to select their child's educational facility would also pass the
secular purpose test.1 20 Further, it appears from Nyquist that the only plan
that would not pass constitutional muster is a scheme that specifies that the
state expenditures were to be received by only sectarian schools. 121 Therefore, general statutory grants for the advancement of all education
will prob122
ably be interpreted by the Court as having a secular purpose.
While the New York statute in Nyquist was held to have a secular purpose, free choice statutes must be distinguishable to prevail under the remaining two prongs of the Lemon test. 123 This necessity originates from the
entanglement of church and state which resulted from the statute at issue in
Nyquist.1 24 The New York statute attempted to lessen the financial burden
on parents paying for non-public education, thereby creating a primary effect of assisting a select group of parents, most of whom utilized sectarian
non-public schools for their childrens' education. 12 In addition, the structure of the statute at issue in Nyquist caused unnecessary entanglement of
the state government with religion.126 Accordingly, free choice legislation
must express the requisite secular purpose of creating economy in education
for all state participants including those who attend public schools.127 The
general nature of the statute will make the state involvement with religious

118. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983) (statute allowing assistance to public
and non-public schools found to pass Lemon test).
119. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (statute must have secular legislative purpose).
120. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 779 (statute providing assistance to parents of non-public

school children passes first prong of Lemon); see also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358
(1975) (invalidated statute passed first prong of Lemon).
121. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 790.

122. See Note, Tax Deductions as Permissible State Aid to ParochialSchools, 60 CHI.

KENT L. REV. 657, 662-63 (1984) (analysis of secular purpose discussion in Lemon decision).

123. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773-75. The New York statute at issue in Nyquist failed the
primary effect and entanglement prongs of Lemon. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782-83.
126. Id.
127. If the free choice legislation is reviewed under establishment clause challenge, much
will turn on the interpretation by the Court of what the actual proclaimed purposes were by
the state legislature. See ag., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971) (Court applies
"motive" analysis).
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institutions only incidental.12
B.

PrimaryEffect Test
The second prong of the Lemon test is whether the statute at issue has the

primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.129 The Court in Nyquist
found that the tuition reimbursement provisions failed this prong of the test
due to the disproportionate benefit of parents who placed their children in
sectarian schools.13 The majority in Nyquist based its decision on a tabulation of the number of sectarian schools benefitted.131 Justice Burger dissented in Nyquist, expressing his disapproval of the "tallying up" application
of the primary effect test by the majority
because this use of the test left no
132
clear indicators for states to follow.

In Mueller, Chief Justice Rehnquist positioned an easily defined boundary
in establishment clause jurisprudence by upholding a statute which gives all
individuals financial assistance for educational expenses.133 By avoiding the
far-reaching method employed by the Nyquist majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist made clear that it is immaterial what percentage of those benefitted
under state educational funding are sectarian schools, as long as the statute
provides general educational grants and tax deductions that are facially neutral and benefit a broad scope of individuals.134 Further, the number of sectarian schools incidentally assisted in Mueller were not at issue because there
was no delineation between public and non-public schools in the Minnesota
statute. 3 ' Therefore, it is critical to the constitutionality of free choice legislation that it be broad in application and scope, without reservation as to
who may utilize the vouchers or tax deduction. In forming the plan to effect
all participants equally, the "tallying up" of beneficiaries is avoided.
Alternatively, if the Nyquist approach of tallying beneficiaries of the statute were taken by the Court in reviewing free choice legislation, the statute
could further be distinguished by employing Mueller. Under the guidelines
of Mueller, a free choice statute must provide equal assistance to all who

128. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 393 (governmental assistance programs which do not violate establishment clause).
129. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (statute must have principal or primary effect which
neither advances nor inhibits religion).
130. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774-80.
131. See id.
132. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 813 (Burger, J., dissenting).
133. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401 (incidental assistance to sectarian schools by facially
neutral statute does not violate establishment clause).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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request it to avoid invalidation under the primary effects test. 3 6 Hence, the
state vouchers or tax deductions must be available for attendance in public
as well as non-public schools. Unlike Nyquist, where only parents of students enrolled in non-public schools were assisted, the proposed free choice
statute assists non-public schools as well as public school students, making
the assistance to sectarian schools incidental.
A paradoxical triangle exists between the primary effects test of Lemon,137
a proposed free choice statute made feasible by Mueller,13 and the free exercise clause. The primary effects test sets parameters to invalidate government actions which have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion.139 However, a free choice statute, fashioned to meet the boundaries
of Mueller, may indirectly advance religion while advancing all educational
facilities. The resulting conflict is further complicated by the free exercise
liberty interest protected by the Court in Pierce v. Society ofSisters,1 " which
found that parents have the right to educate their children at the school of
their choice.14 1 To accommodate all three interests, it is necessary to adhere
to the approach promulgated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Mueller.14 2 The
Chief Justice refused to muddle establishment clause jurisprudence with the
yearly burden of monitoring attendance records of non-public versus public
schools to determine the primary effect of those benefitting from the facially
neutral Minnesota statute.1 43 Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist made it evident that the primary effect of a statute would not turn on how many nonpublic schools were indeed sectarian, if the benefits were open to secular
schools as well. 1" While Mueller's bright line approach makes a free choice
plan feasible under establishment clause boundaries, it also accommodates
the free exercise liberty shielded by Pierce, placing the control of school
choice back in the hands of parents. In addition, the Court in Mueller effectively avoids the placement of establishment clause precedent on roaming
variables such as enrollment rates of non-public sectarian schools, which will
change dramatically when the financial barrier to non-public schools is lifted

136. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396-412 (Minnesota statute does not restrict its tax deduction benefits to parents of non-public school children).
137. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (three prong test to determine Establishment Clause
violation).
138. Mueller makes possible free choice in that it allows incidental assistance to nonpublic sectarian school by a facially neutral statute. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396-402.
139. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
140. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
141. Id. at 535.
142. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396-402.
143. Id.
144. Id. See Smart, Tax Deductionsas PermissibleState Aid to ParochialSchools, 60 CHi.
KENT L. REV. 657, 681 (1984) (after Mueller states are free to aid religious schools).
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and a free market is allowed to operate. 4 5
Opponents to free choice challenge the plan under the primary effects test
of Lemon because financial assistance can potentially flow to religious institutions. 1 6 The Court has addressed the effect of state aid to individuals who
ultimately apply the funds to gain religious instruction.147 In Witters, the
Court determined that if vocational rehabilitation financing is granted to all
who qualify for assistance and is granted directly to them, the fact that the
funds find their way to religious institutions does not have the primary effect
of promoting or inhibiting religion.14 The Witters decision was delivered
for the majority by Justice Marshall, who wrote the strong dissent in the five
to four decision of Mueller.14 9 The Witters opinion suggests a change in
position as to what constitutes "direct" financial assistance to religious institutions for Justice Marshall and the other Supreme Court Justices joining in
Justice Marshall's dissent in Mueller.15 In this apparent change of position
on his stance on establishment clause jurisprudence, Justice Marshall did not
discuss Mueller in the primary effects analysis of the statute at issue in Witters."5 Although Justice Marshall avoided discussing Mueller in his opinion, Witters nonetheless solidified the precedent that state programs which
are neutral in offering educational assistance to classes defined without men-

145. See Gannett News Service, Sept 14, 1990 at 1 (school boards fear demise of public
school system if choice is adopted). Opposition by currently employed public school administrators is apparent in the over two million dollars spent by school boards in lobbying against a
free choice bill promulgated by Oregonians for Educational Choice. Id.
146. See id.; see also Mueller, 463 U.S. at 404-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (money will
flow directly to sectarian schools if state education funds were used for choice).
147. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986)
(statute providing aid to vocational rehabilitation program for blind man's training at Christian college upheld).
148. Id. at 488-89. While the Court has been careful to distinguish their decisions upholding statutes affecting state universities and those that apply to primary and secondary
public schools, the division was lessened by Mergens. Compare Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 583-85 (1987) (statutory funds to sectarian primary and secondary school's invalidated) with Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, - U.S. - 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2366, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191, 199 (equal access by religions group to secondary
public school and state university programs do not violate establishment clause). California
courts have already held that the payment of tuition directly to a student who then pays for
tuition at a nonsectarian school does not violate the state constitution which prohibits direct or
indirect state aid to parochial schools. See, Board of Trustees v. Cory, 145 Cal. Rptr. 136, 138
(1978).
149. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 404 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in
Justice Marshall's dissent. Id.
151. Compare Mueller, 463 U.S. at 404-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (primary effect of
statute is to foster religion) with Witters, 474 U.S. at 481-90 (opinion by Justice Marshall
apparently altering stand on what constitutes establishment clause violation).
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tion of religion do not violate the primary effects test of Lemon. 5 2
C. Excessive Entanglement Test
Because free choice legislation may allow for state standards of accreditation in order to provide information upon which parents can base their selection of schools, there may be some administrative role for the state in the
free choice educational plan. However, this does not provide grounds for
the excessive entanglement proscribed by the third prong of the Lemon
test.15 3 The Court has made clear that no entanglement of church and state
exists when consistent supervision or control of the religious institution by
the state is absent. 54 In addition, the free choice plan's objective is to advance the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of education-not to lessen the
financial burden of parents utilizing non-public schools, as was the case in
Nyquist, where excessive entanglement was found to exist. Much like the
statute at issue in Mueller, the free choice plan does not limit its assistance to
a predominately sectarian group and therefore passes the excessive entanglement test of Lemon.
V.

CONCLUSION

While state school boards continue to resist the adoption of educational
free choice legislation after the Edgewood v. Kirby decision, two schools of
thought promote free choice as the only means of achieving effective and
efficient schools. Free market economists suggest that the lack of competition in the monopolistic public school system should be replaced with a
voucher or tax deduction system of financing education, thereby alleviating
the need for the costly bureaucracy inherent in the present district system.
Alternatively, free choice is also promulgated by those who maintain that
their free exercise liberty interests are encroached by the refusal of the public
school system to finance the education of children who attend sectarian
schools to further religious convictions. Both the economic and free exercise
contentions demanding education reform legislation must be cast as dictated
by the equality standard established by Edgewood and not violate the parameters of establishment clause jurisprudence as prescribed by the three-prong
test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.
Proposed free choice legislation will pass the secular purpose prong of the
Lemon inquiry by stating that choice of educational institutions including
152. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 491 (Powell, J., concurring) (Mueller should have been applied by Justice Marshall in Witters).
153. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 ("statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion").
154. See Walz v. Tax Comnm'n, 397 U.S. 644, 705 (1970) (tax exemptions allowed to
churches in same category with hospitals, libraries and scientific groups).
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sectarian schools promotes plurality and individualism and therefore furthers the public interest protected by the free exercise clause. In order to
pass the second prong of the Lemon test, the primary effect of the reform
statute will necessarily be to provide financial assistance to both public and
private school children. By benefitting a broad scope of individuals, as did
the statute at issue in Mueller, free choice legislation will circumvent the
demise suffered by the Nyquist statute under primary effect analysis, which
suggested that the statute was too limited in its application to pass constitutional muster. Finally, the free choice statute must not include administrative state systems to perform regular monitoring or evaluation of non-public
schools. Without these administrative duties by the state, excessive entanglement forbidden by the last prong of the Lemon test will successfully be
avoided. By adhering closely to the guidelines intimated by the Court in the
past interpretations of the Lemon establishment clause test, states will optimize the probability of their free choice legislation withstanding an establishment clause challenge.
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VI.

APPENDIX

A

MEASURE ELEVEN
PARAGRAPH 1. The Constitution of the State of Oregon is amended by
creating a new Article to be known as Article VIII-A and to read:
Article VIII-A
SECTION 1. The state shall improve basic education through competition
and diversity by providing for choice between different schools and different
kinds of schooling.
SECTION 2. The state shall institute an open enrollment plan for government schools by the 1991-1992 school year. The plan shall allow families to
choose their children's schools, even if the schools are in other school districts. The Legislative Assembly shall enact by law the standards used to
accept or reject applications under the plan. The Legislative Assembly shall
enact by law the rules for financing open enrollment.
SECTION 3. The state shall provide a personal income tax credit for basic
education expenses incurred after July 31, 1991. Any person who pays a
student's education expenses during a school year is eligible for the credit,
subject to these requirements:
(1) The student does not attend a government school during the school year.
(2) The student lives in Oregon when the expenses are incurred.
(3) The student is at least five years of age and under nineteen years of age
when the expenses are incurred. The Legislative Assembly may authorize
waivers of the age requirements.
(4) The student's resident school district is notified that the student will not
be attending a government school. Notice must be given by May 1 before
the school year or within 30 days after moving into the district. A district
may waive this requirement.
(5) The maximum tax credit per student shall be $1,200 for tax year 1991.
The maximum tax credit per student shall be $2,500 for tax year 1992 if the
student is eligible in both school years overlapping the tax year, or $1,250 if
the student is eligible in an overlapping school year. The maximum tax
credits shall then be adjusted annually in proportion to changes in the cost of
living. The Legislative Assembly by law may set higher maximums for students with special needs.
(6) Eligible expenses include tuition and any kind of educational good or
service that a majority of Oregon's government schools subsidize or provide
without charge.
(7) One hundred percent of eligible expenses may be subtracted from Oregon income tax owed, up to the maximum credit allowed. Documentation
for claimed expenses must be submitted with each tax return that claims the
credit.
(8) One person can claim credits for multiple students. Multiple persons
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can claim credits for one student, but the sum of those claims cannot exceed
the allowed maximum.
(9) The credit is refundable. A property claimed credit shall be paid even if
it exceeds the tax otherwise owed.
(10) Secular and religious education are equally eligible for the credit. Institutional schooling and home schooling are equally eligible for the credit.
SECTION 4. Choice in basic education shall be financed as follows:
(1) The state shall establish an Educational Choice Fund. The state shall
pay into the Educational Choice Fund a proportion of other state funds for
basic education equal to the proportion of students using the basic education
tax credit.
(2) For each student using the basic education tax credit for a school year,
the student's resident school district shall pay into the Educational Choice
Fund a base amount minus the amount of state and federal funds that the
district would have received for the student. The base amount for the 19911992 school year shall be $3,000. The base amount shall then be adjusted
annually in proportion to changes in the cost of living. The Legislative Assembly may set higher base amounts for students with special needs, in proportion to any higher tax credits allowed for such students.
(3) Monies in the Educational Choice Fund may be used to reimburse the
state for its tax credit costs, to provide impact aid to school districts, or for
tax relief.
SECTION 5. Genuine choice requires that educational alternatives be protected from excessive regulation. Accordingly, neither the state nor local
governments shall create any new laws or rules regulating nongovernment
basic education nor make existing laws or rules more restrictive or burdensome, unless such a measure is referred to the voters at a general election.
This section shall not prevent the state or local governments from revising
laws or rules to make them less restrictive.
SECTION 6. The Legislative Assembly shall enact legislation to carry out
the provisions hereof. This article shall supersede all conflicting constitutional provisions.
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VII. APPENDIX B

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FREE CHOICE
SYSTEM OF PUBLIC FREE SCHOOLS
AN ACT RELATING TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EDUCATION;
FUNDING; LOCAL AUTONOMY; PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION:
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE
Section 1.01. The short title of this Act shall be the EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FREE CHOICE EDUCATION PROGRAM.
Section 1.02. Definitions. The following definitions apply to this Act:
a. Public School. Any school operated which is solely administered, operated, and staffed by state or local governments and their employees.
b. Free School. A non-governmental educational establishment for the
general education of elementary and secondary students between the general
scholastic ages, which accepts student scholarships funded by the State
under this program in lieu of tuition.
c. Home School. The provision of education directly to the child by the
parent, custodian or guardian, in a home setting.
d. Private School. A non-governmental educational establishment
which does not accept state scholarships funded by the State under this program in lieu of tuition.
Section 1.03. PublicPolicy and Purpose. The purpose of this legislation is
to respond to inefficiencies in the current public school system, which have
seriously hindered the general diffusion of knowledge measured by student
performance, especially that of minorities. It is the policy of the State that a
suitable and efficient system of publicly funded schools be established and
maintained. Providing public funded education is a constitutionally mandated duty, but public education can be provided through government operated schools as well as privately operated entities, as long as public funds are
available to all schoolchildren to pay for an education at public expense.
Because a monopoly is not an efficient way to provide education, this State
no longer desires to have a monopoly on the provision of public education,
but shall encourage innovation, freedom of choice, parental involvement,
and autonomous decision making for each school as the solution to the severe deficiencies in education produced by its previous government monopoly. This legislation will create an alternative public educational system of
free schools to be operated concurrently with the present public education
system. The combination of public and free schools constitutes a public free
school system. Public schools will be publicly operated, free schools will be
privately operated. Free schools will be free of any regulations not essential
for the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people and available to
all on a free tuition basis through public education scholarships funded by
the state.
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Section 2.01. Parental Choice. Notwithstanding any other law, every
school age child shall be entitled to attend the public school, private school,
or home school chosen for them by their parent, guardian or custodian, subject to availability, regardless of residence. A student may exercise his own
choice after reaching the age of majority. Each child's choice will be registered with the central office of the public school district of his residence in
order to obtain public financing. A private school which does not accept any
state scholarships from any student is not subject to the provisions of this
Act, however, acceptance of any state scholarship from any student shall
subject a private school to the provisions of this Act and such schools shall
be known as free schools. All public schools are also subject to the provisions of this Act.
Section 3.01. Financing. Notwithstanding any law or Education Code
provision to the contrary, each public school district currently existing or
hereafter created under the Education Code, shall obtain its public financing
based on the Education Code, however, average daily attendance will include all school age children residing in said district and registering their
choice with the district, even if they do not choose to attend school at a
public school in their district of residence. The total funding received by
each district from state and local sources will be divided on a category of
student basis according to formulas to be adopted by the State Board of
Education which may include different amounts for different categories of
students. The total per student funding amount, less a reduction for capital
outlays, and a reasonable reserve for each public school district, shall constitute the child's public education scholarship. This scholarship will be divided into monthly installments and be paid by the 10th school day of each
month. The child's public education scholarship is the entitlement of the
child, under the supervision of the child's parent, guardian or custodian, not
that any school of any kind, and shall be paid to the school solely as a means
of administrative convenience. No public school shall have any direct right
or entitlement to receipt of the public education scholarship based solely on
residence.
Section 3.02. Conditionsfor Receipt of Funds by Free Schools.
a. The per child allocation established in Section 3.01 constituting the
child's education scholarship shall be the entitlement of each child regardless
of which school he attends, public or private. Such public education scholarship is solely the entitlement of the child and no funds shall be paid directly to any free school, unless it be at the direction of the student, their
parent, guardian or custodian.
b. The United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution both guarantee the right to the free exercise of religion of the parents and child,
through their parent, guardian or custodian, and such right shall not be
abridged by the state or any government official, whether executive, legisla-
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tive or judicial. The purpose of this legislation is not to aid or inhibit religious education, nor is it to prohibit the free exercise of religion, but to
neutrally provide equal educational benefits to all citizens, regardless of religious affiliation or lack thereof.
c. Any free school which complies with the following provisions and in
which the child is enrolled on the first day of the month shall receive from
the child's resident public school district the child's monthly public education scholarship allocation. In order to receive the child's monthly public
education scholarship allotment, the school selected by the child must certify to the child's resident district that it has complied with the following
conditions:
a. If the school has more applicants than positions, it must fill the
positions by lottery. All positions in public and free schools must
be filled by lottery the first year of this program, or the first year a
school is in operation or the first year a private school accepts
funds under this plan, and becomes a free school, whichever is
later, but after said first year for each school, that school may give
preference to current students for the sake of continuity, and preference may be given to students residing in the same household for
the sake of custodial convenience. Schools may conduct their lotteries on May 1 for the fall school year or monthly thereafter for as
long as necessary to fill all positions.
b. If the free school accepts any state public education scholarship money, it must charge no individual student more than the
amount of the child's scholarship.
c. No free school accepting state public education scholarship
funds may refuse to admit students on the basis of residence, religion, race, national origin or ethnic background.
d. Students attending free schools shall be tested in accordance
with Sec. 6.01.
Section 3.03. Who May Operate Schools. Any non-profit or profit corporation, partnership, or association, may operate a free school and accept student scholarship funds, including without limitation, schools founded by
parents, teachers, or others. A parent, custodian or guardian may also operate a home school for their own children. Public schools shall be created
and governed in accordance with the Education Code, except to the extent in
conflict with this Act.
Section 3.04. Home Schools. A child who is enrolled in a home school
may receive his public education scholarship paid directly to the parent,
guardian or custodian, from the resident public school district. Home
schools need not comply with Section 3.02, but must submit to the requirements of Section 6.01 as a condition to continued receipt of funds.
Section 4.01. Non-State Action and Free School Autonomy. Nothing in
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this legislation shall turn a free school, or home school which accepts a
child's public education scholarships into an agent or arm of the government, and the conduct of such institutions shall be governed by the law governing private conduct, not state action. The purpose of this legislation is to
allow freedom to the private sector to respond to educational needs without
excessive government control and shall be liberally construed to that end.
Free schools are not subject to any educational regulations or statutes except
those expressly set forth in this Program, or as set forth in Sec. 6.01.
Section 5.01. PublicSchoolAutonomy. In order to allow free competition
between public and private entities in education, public schools may file a
request for an exemption from all or part of the State Education Code provisions. A public school board may apply for exemption for the entire district,
or each individual school may file for an exemption if 75% of the teachers at
that school so indicate by written anonymous ballot, with voting conducted
by the superintendent or a delegated employee other than the principal. The
exemption will automatically take effect 30 days after the request for exemption is filed with the Commissioner of Education. An exemption may be
revoked after one year of poor student performance determined by the Commissioner of Education upon 30 days notice to the district or individual
school.
Section 6.01. Accountability. In order to allow innovation and local autonomy while insuring accountability for the results, the State Board of Education (SBOE) will conduct and administer at public expense at least two
standardized norm referenced tests on those subjects it finds to be essential
to the preservation of liberty and the rights of the people for each grade
level, one near the beginning and one near the end of the school year. The
results for public and free schools will be published by the State Board of
Education, and copies of the statewide scores must be made available for
parental inspection at each public or free school. The State can achieve sufficient curricular control through testing, publication of results, and parental
control, without further excessive governmental regulation. No regulation
of free schools other than in this statute shall be allowed, except for those
schools whose student scores register in the bottom thirty percent of student
achievement gains between the beginning and ending tests. The Commissioner of Education may investigate the reasons for such poor free school
performance. After reasonable notice of deficiencies and opportunity for
correction, and failure to do so, if such achievement gains are below those of
all public schools in the area, then the Commissioner may prohibit the receipt of future scholarships by that free school.
Section 7.01. Criminal Penalties. Appropriate theft or embezzlement
penalties for false reporting.
Section 8.01. Regulatory Authority. The State Board of Education may
promulgate only those regulations which are necessary and essential to the
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effective implementation of this Act, consistent with its express provisions
and legislative purpose. Such regulations, if any, will be subject to strict
scrutiny by the Courts.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

35

